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COMPELLING WAR CORRESPONDENTS
TO TESTIFY: A PREROGATIVE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS?
JENNIFER S. JONES†

ABSTRACT
A  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents  was  recognized  
by  the  Appeals  Chamber  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  
Former  Yugoslavia  in  the  case  of  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin.  This  article  
examines  whether  war  correspondents  should  enjoy  such  a  privilege  in  
international  criminal  tribunals.  
  
The   author   illustrates   that,   to   maintain   their   legitimacy,  
international  criminal  tribunals  must  be  able  to  make  factually  accurate  
ﬁndings.  She  further  illustrates  that  the  ability  of  international  criminal  
tribunals  to  make  factually  accurate  ﬁndings  is  dependant  upon  their  
ability   to   obtain   reliable   evidence,   including   witness   testimony.   The  
suggestion  is  made  that,  as  testimonial  privileges  reduce  the  evidence  
that  is  available  to  international  criminal  tribunals,  and  thereby  impair  
the   tribunals’   fact-ﬁnding   abilities,   they   should   be   granted   sparingly  
and  construed  narrowly.  
  
The  author  recognizes  that  it  is  necessary  to  protect  the  public  
interest   in   the   work   of   war   correspondents   and   acknowledges   that   a  
testimonial  privilege  may  be  necessary  to  protect  war  correspondents  
from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  conﬁdential  sources  and  materials.  
She  argues,  however,  that  the  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  established  
in  Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  –  which  seeks  to  protect  war  correspondents  
from   being   compelled   to   testify   about   non-conﬁdential   sources   and  
materials  –  is  unwarranted.  In  the  author’s  opinion,  measures  short  of  
a  testimonial  privilege  will  sufﬁce  to  avoid  any  adverse  consequences  
that   might   ﬂow   from   compelling   war   correspondents   to   testify   about  
non-conﬁdential  sources.
†
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INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the issue of whether international criminal tribunals ought to recognize a testimonial privilege for war correspondents.1
The issue is important because testimonial privileges, when construed
too broadly, can threaten the legitimacy of international criminal tribunals. Part I of this article introduces the three existing international
criminal tribunals. It describes the roles the international community
has assigned to them and some of the goals it is hoped their proceedings
might serve. Part I also introduces the idea that the success of international criminal tribunals hinges on their ability to make factually accurate  ﬁndings.  Part  II  involves  a  discussion  of  witness  testimony  before  
international criminal tribunals. It illustrates that witnesses are a crucial
source of evidence in international criminal proceedings and examines
the power that international criminal tribunals have been given to compel witness testimony. Part II also demonstrates that, in order to protect
certain interests and relationships, international criminal tribunals have
seen  ﬁt  to  grant  testimonial  privileges  to  some  individuals  and  classes  
of  people.  Part  III  offers  a  detailed  review  of  the  Randal  case,  the  ﬁrst  
and only case to consider whether international criminal tribunals can
compel the testimony of war correspondents.2 The case is critiqued and
consideration   is   given   to   whether   the   qualiﬁed   testimonial   privilege  
it created should be adopted by the recently established International
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC). Finally, Part IV advances the argument that, while a testimonial privilege is necessary to protect war correspondents  from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  conﬁdential  sources  
and  materials,  measures  short  of  a  testimonial  privilege  will  sufﬁce  to  
avoid  the  adverse  consequences  that  might  ﬂow  from  compelling  war  
correspondents  to  testify  about  non-conﬁdential  sources  and  materials.  

1

In this paper the term ‘war correspondents’ will be used to refer to journalists who
report,  or  investigate  for  the  purpose  of  reporting,  directly  from  conﬂict  zones.
2
Prosecutor  v.  Brdjanin  (11 December 2002), Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) [Randal Case].
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I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
1. Roles Assigned to International Criminal Tribunals
At present, there are three international criminal tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY),
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) and
the ICC.3 All three tribunals are designed to end impunity, and enhance
accountability, for major international crimes.4 The ICTY has been
charged with the task of prosecuting those “persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”5 It has jurisdiction to try alleged perpetrators of: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against
humanity.6 The ICTR has been charged with the task of prosecuting those
“persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring
States” between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.7 It has jurisdiction to try alleged perpetrators of: genocide, crimes against humanity
and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol II.8 Finally, the ICC has been charged with the
task of prosecuting those responsible for “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole,” namely: the crime

3

There are also hybrid (national/international) criminal tribunals, like the Special
Court for the Sierra Leone, which apply both domestic and international law and
involve both domestic and international actors. Such tribunals, however, are beyond
the ambit of this paper.
4
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International  Criminal  Evidence  (New
York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002) xiii.
5
Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former  Yugoslavia, UN
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), art. 1 [ICTY Statute].
6
Ibid.  arts. 2-5.
7
Statute  for  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  Rwanda,  UN SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453d Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 1 [ICTR Statute].
8
Ibid. arts. 2-4.
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of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.9
2. Goals Served by International Criminal Proceedings
A number of important goals can be served by having perpetrators of
major international crimes tried before international criminal tribunals.
First,   international   criminal   proceedings   “can   be   highly   signiﬁcant   to  
the victims of atrocities.”10 By acknowledging the suffering that victims
have endured, international criminal proceedings can provide victims,
and their relatives and friends, with a sense of justice and closure.11 Second, international criminal proceedings can contribute to the restoration
and maintenance of peace by working to repair the damage done to
societies “traumatized by massive human rights violations.”12 International criminal proceedings can legitimize contested facts and thereby
make  it  “difﬁcult  for  individuals  and  society  to  take  refuge  in  denial  and  
avoid the truth.”13 They can also individualize guilt and thus preclude
the “demonisation of entire nations or groups.”14 Third, by sending a
clear message that the commission of major international crimes will
not be tolerated, international criminal proceedings can serve to deter
future crimes.15 Finally, international criminal proceedings can help en-

9

Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,
art. 5 [ICC Statute].
10
Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability  for  Human  Rights  Atrocities  
in  International  Law:  Beyond  the  Nuremburg  Legacy,  2d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 155.
11
Eric Stover, The  Witnesses:  War  Crimes  and  the  Promise  of  Justice  in  The  Hague  
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) at 12.
12
Ratner & Abrams, supra  note 10.
13
Stover, supra  note 11.
14
Kelly Buchanan, “Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An
Analysis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists” (2004) 35
V.U.W.L.R. 609 at 636.
15
Emily A. Berman, “In Pursuit of Accountability: The Red Cross, War
Correspondents, and Evidentiary Privileges in International Criminal Tribunals”
(2005) 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 241 at 249.
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sure that those who commit major international crimes are appropriately
punished.16
3. The Importance of Factually Accurate Findings
It is of primary importance that, when adjudicating allegations of major international crimes, international criminal tribunals determine the
facts that gave rise to the allegations “with the greatest degree of accuracy possible.”17 If international criminal tribunals fail to make factually
accurate   ﬁndings,   their   decisions   will   most   certainly   be   questioned.18
Worse,   their   factually-ﬂawed   ﬁndings   might   lead   to   unjust   results   or,  
at the very least, create a perception that justice has not been served.19
This, in turn, might threaten the legitimacy of international criminal tribunals and forfeit the possibility that they will serve the lofty goals outlined above. In light of the need for international criminal tribunals to
make  factually  accurate  ﬁndings,  it  is  essential  that  they  have  the  ability  
to obtain relevant and truthful evidence.20

II.WITNESS TESTIMONY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
1. The Importance of Witness Testimony
As in domestic criminal proceedings, witnesses are an important source
of evidence in international criminal proceedings.21 In fact, witness testimony often plays a crucial role in the prosecution of major international crimes.22 In most cases before the ICTY, for example, the testimony
of a substantial number of witnesses has been required to prove that
16

Ratner & Abrams, supra  note 10.
Gregory A. McClelland, “A Non-Adversary Approach to International Criminal
Tribunals” (2002) 26 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 1 at 5.
18
Ibid.
19
McClelland, supra  note 17.
20
Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 637.
21
May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 163.
22
Berman, supra  note 15 at 245.
17
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major international crimes were committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.23 That the ICTY has had to make “lavish use of witness
testimony” is supported by statistics.24  Nearly  1,000  witnesses  testiﬁed  
before the tribunal between January 1, 1998 and July 1, 2001.25 In the
Krstić26 case alone, which involved only a single accused, the testimony
of 117 witnesses was required.27 The fact that perpetrators of atrocities
in the former Yugoslavia “left few paper trails behind” might explain
why witness testimony has proven to be such a vital source of evidence
in trials before the ICTY.28 Whatever the explanation, there is no doubt
that witnesses are “the lifeblood of ICTY trials.”29
Like the ICTY, the ICTR relies heavily on witness testimony. Witness testimony has been crucial to the determination of the guilt or innocence of accused persons who have been tried before the ICTR.30 While
the ICC has yet to try a case, it seems more than likely that it too will
have to rely heavily on the testimony of witnesses.31
2. The Power to Compel Witness Testimony
Because witnesses are such an important source of evidence in international criminal proceedings, it is essential that “those witnesses most
likely to have probative evidence” are available to international criminal tribunals.32 Unfortunately, witnesses are often either unavailable
to international criminal tribunals or reluctant to give testimony, and
subject themselves to “the rigors of cross-examination,” before interna23

Patricia M. Wald, “Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the
Yugoslav Tribunal” (2002) 5 Yale Human Rts. & Dev. L.J. 217 at 219.
24
Ibid. at 217.
25
Wald, supra  note 23.
26
Prosecutor  v.  Krstić  (2 August 2001), Case No. IT-98-33 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I), online: United Nations <http://
www.un.org/icty/>.
27
Wald, supra  note 23.
28
Wald, supra  note 23 at 219-220.
29
Wald, supra  note 23.
30
Berman, supra  note 15 at 250.
31
Berman, supra  note 15 at 250.
32
Berman, supra  note 15 at 245.
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tional criminal tribunals.33 To help alleviate this problem, international
criminal tribunals have been granted the formal power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses.34
The  rules  governing  both  the  ICTY  and  the  ICTR  speciﬁcally  grant  
the tribunals the power to “issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas,
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial.”35 Similarly,
the statute governing the ICC provides that “[i]n performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial,” the ICC has the power
to “[r]equire the attendance and testimony of witnesses.”36 The power
to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses is also derived
from the “inherent powers” the international criminal tribunals enjoy
as courts.37 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that the ICTY
is vested with the authority to compel the attendance and testimony of
“individuals who may be of assistance in the task of dispensing criminal
justice.”38 No doubt the same can be said of the ICTR and the ICC. Of
course, as with most powers enjoyed by courts, the power international
criminal tribunals have to compel witness testimony is not absolute.
3. Testimonial Privileges
i.  Generally
Although it is generally understood “that justice is best served when
all  relevant  evidence  is  placed  before  the  fact-ﬁnder,”  there  are  eviden33

May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at xviii.
Kate MacKintosh, “Note for Humanitarian Organizations on Cooperation with
International Tribunals” (2004) 86:853 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 131 at 132.
35
Rules  of  Procedure  and  Evidence, IT/32/Rev.36, rule 54, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm> [ICTY Rules] .<http://65.18.216.88/
ENGLISH/rules/070605/070605.pdf> [ICTR Rules].
36
ICC Statute, supra  note 9, art. 64(6)(b).
37
May & Wierda, supra  note 4 at 190.
38
Prosecutor  v.  Blaškić  (1997), Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , Appeals Chamber) at
paras. 47-48 online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty> [Blaškić  Interlocutory  
Appeal].
34
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tiary rules, like testimonial privileges, which have the effect of reducing the availability of relevant evidence.39 Testimonial privileges allow
witnesses to refuse to testify in spite of the fact that they may possess
relevant evidence. Such privileges are typically recognized by domestic
courts in circumstances where it appears they will protect “interests and
relationships  considered  sufﬁciently  important  to  society  to  warrant  the  
loss of otherwise competent testimony.”40 Testimonial privileges exist,
for  example,  to  protect:  conﬁdential  communications  between  lawyers  
and their clients, medical practitioners and their patients, and journalists
and their sources.41 When a testimonial privilege is recognized, it signiﬁes  that  a  determination  has  been  made  that  the  purposes  served  by  the  
privilege  outweigh  the  fact-ﬁnding  beneﬁts  that  might  be  gained  if  the  
testimony in issue could be compelled.42 Of course, because testimonial
privileges  can  impair  a  fact-ﬁnder’s  ability  to  serve  justice,  they  tend  to  
be disfavoured and narrowly construed.43
A distinction should be drawn at this point between absolute and
qualiﬁed   testimonial   privileges.   Absolute   testimonial   privileges   cannot be overcome. They guarantee that the witness whose testimony is
sought  cannot  be  compelled  to  testify.  Qualiﬁed  testimonial  privileges,  
on the other hand, can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the need
for the testimony sought outweighs the interest that is being protected
by the privilege.44
ii.  Testimonial  Privileges  in  the  ICTY  and  the  ICTR
Like many domestic courts, international criminal tribunals grant testimonial privileges to certain individuals and groups.45 The rules governing the ICTY and the ICTR, for example, recognize that “all communications between lawyer and client” are privileged and consequently not
39

Berman, supra  note 15 at 255.
  Anthony  L.  Fargo,  “The  Journalist’s  Privilege  for  Non-Conﬁdential  Information  
in States with Shield Laws” (1999) 4 Comm. L. & Pol’y 325 at 361.
41
Berman, supra  note 15 at 256.
42
Berman, supra  note 15 at 256.
43
Berman, supra  note 15 at 255.
44
Buchanan, supra  note 14 at 623.
45
Steven Powles, “To Testify or Not to Testify – Privilege from Testimony at the Ad
Hoc Tribunals: The Randal  Decision” (2003) 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 511 at 513.
40
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subject to disclosure.46 In addition, through its jurisprudence, the ICTY
has recognized a number of testimonial privileges. In Delalić,47 a Trial
Chamber held that employees and functionaries of the ICTY should not
be called upon to give evidence and refused to issue a subpoena to an
ICTY interpreter.48 Similarly, on another motion, the Appeals Chamber
held  that  a  Senior  Legal  Ofﬁcer  and  the  former  President  of  the  ICTY  
could not be “subpoenaed to testify as witnesses on matters relating
to  their  ofﬁcial  duties  or  functions.”49  In  the  Blaškić  Interlocutory  Appeal,50  state  ofﬁcials  acting  in  their  ofﬁcial  capacity  were  “effectively  
granted an absolute privilege from testimony.”51 On another motion, a
Trial Chamber considered it necessary to obtain a waiver of immunity
from the Secretary-General of the United Nations before it could require
the testimony of a former Commander of United Nations Protection
Force.52  In  Simić,53 a Trial Chamber determined that the International
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC) “enjoys an absolute
privilege  to  withhold  its  conﬁdential  information”  and  thus  has  the  power to prevent its employees from testifying to information they obtained
in  the  course  of  their  ofﬁcial  duties.54 And, in the Randal case, which
46

ICTY Rules, supra  note 35, rule 97; ICTR Rules, supra  note 35, rule 97.
Prosecutor  v.  Delalić  (1997), Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Motion Ex  
Parte  by the Defence of Zdravko Mucic Concerning the Issue of a Subpoena to an
Interpreter (Internation Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber)
online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
48
Powles, supra  note 45.
49
Prosecutor  v.  Delalić  (1999), Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on Motion to Preserve
and Provide Evidence (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Appeals Chamber) online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
50
Supra  note 38.
51
Powles, supra  note 45.
52
Prosecutor  v.  Blaškić  (1999), Case No. IT-95-14 Decision of Trial Chamber I on
Protective Measures for General Phillipe Morillon, Witness of the Trial Chamber
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I), online:
United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
53
Prosecutor  v.  Simić  (1999), Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution
Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online:
United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty>.
54
  Gabor  Rona,  “The  ICRC  Privilege  Not  to  Testify:  Conﬁdentiality  in  Action”  
(28 February 2004), online: < http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
5WSD9Q?OpenDocument>.
47
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will be discussed in great detail in the next section, the Appeals Chamber  granted  a  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  to  war  correspondents.
Although the author has not researched the issue of whether testimonial privileges have been established by the ICTR, it is likely that the
ICTR respects the testimonial privileges the ICTY has created. This is
certainly the case with testimonial privileges that have been established
by the Appeals Chamber, as the Appeals Chamber is shared by the ICTY
and the ICTR.
iii.  Testimonial  Privileges  in  the  ICC
Like the rules governing the ICTY and the ICTR, the rules governing the
ICC recognize that “communications made in the context of the professional relationship between a person and his or her legal counsel shall
be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure.”55
In addition, the ICC’s rules provide that “communications made in the
context  of  a  class  of  professional  or  other  conﬁdential  relationships  shall  
be regarded as privileged, and subsequently not subject to disclosure”
when it is determined that:
Communications occurring within that class of relationship are made
in  the  course  of  a  conﬁdential  relationship  producing  a  reasonable  
expectation of privacy and non-disclosure;
Conﬁdentiality   is   essential   to   the   nature   and   type   of   relationship  
between  the  person  and  the  conﬁdant;;  and
Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the
Statute and the Rules.56

The ICC’s rules go on to provide that, in deciding whether communications  made  in  the  context  of  a  class  of  professional  or  other  conﬁdential relationships shall be regarded as privileged, the ICC must “give
particular regard to recognizing as privileged those communications
made in the context of the professional relationship between a person
and his or her medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor,
55

Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, rule 73(1), online: United
Nations  <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/ofﬁcialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_
Evid_070704-EN.pdf>  [ICC  Rules].
56
Ibid.  rule 73(2).
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[…] or between a person and a member of a religious clergy.”57 Finally,
the rules governing the ICC recognize the absolute testimonial privilege
the  ICTY  granted  to  the  ICRC  in  Simić.58 It is worth noting at this point
that, like the rules which govern many domestic courts, the rules governing  the  ICC  only  contemplate  that  “communications  made  in  conﬁdence between persons holding certain relationships” shall be regarded
as privileged.59

III. A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS
In the Randal case, the ICTY was called upon to determine whether
international criminal tribunals ought to grant a testimonial privilege to
journalists  reporting  from  conﬂict  zones.  The  ICTY  was  the  ﬁrst,  and  is  
to date the only, international criminal tribunal to consider this issue.
1. The Randal Case
i.  Facts
During   the   armed   conﬂict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia,   Jonathan   Randal  
(hereinafter Randal) worked as a war correspondent for the Washington Post. As part of the investigative work he did in Banja Luka, Randal interviewed one Radoslav Brdjanin (hereinafter Brdjanin). Because
Randal did not speak Serbo-Croatian, and Brdjanin did not speak English, the interview was conducted with the interpretive assistance of a
journalist who spoke both languages. Following the interview, Randal
wrote an article which was published in the Washington Post.60 The
article described Brdjanin as a “Bosnian Serb housing administrator”
57

ICC Rules, supra  note 55, rule 73(3).
ICC Rules, supra  note 55, rule 73(4).
59
Carey Lening & Henry Cohen, Journalists’  Privilege  to  Withhold  Information  
in  Judicial  and  Other  Proceedings:  State  Shield  Statutes (Congressional Research
Service, 2005) at 1, online: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32806.pdf>.
60
Jonathan C. Randal, “Preserving the Fruits of Ethnic Cleansing; Bosnian Serbs,
Expulsion Victims See Process as Beyond Reversal” Washington  Post  (11 February
1993) A34.
58
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and “an avowed radical Serb nationalist”.61 It quoted Brdjanin as having said: (1) “those unwilling to defend [Bosnian Serb territory] must
be moved out” to “create an ethnically clean space”; (2) Muslims and
Croats “should not be killed, but should be allowed to leave - and good
riddance”; (3) Serb authorities are paying “too much attention to human rights”; and, (4) “[w]e are going to defend our frontiers at any cost
[...] and wherever our army boots stand.”62 The article also claimed that
Brdjanin was in the process of “preparing laws to expel non-Serbs from
government housing to make room for 15,000 Serb refugees and for
Serb combatants’ families.”63
Years after the publication of Randal’s article, the ICTY charged
Brdjanin with: genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and violations of the laws or customs
of war.64 Brdjanin was subsequently brought before the ICTY to stand
trial for the major international war crimes he was charged with. During a pre-trial conference, the Prosecution sought to introduce Randal’s
article into evidence on the basis that it was relevant to establishing that
Brdjanin possessed the requisite intent to commit the crimes he was
charged with. The Defence objected on several grounds arguing, inter  
alia, that the statements the article attributed to Brdjanin were inaccurate. The Defence asserted that, if the article were admitted, they would
need an opportunity to cross-examine Randal. In response, the Prosecution requested that a subpoena be issued to compel Randal’s attendance
and testimony.65 On January 29, 2002, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY
(hereinafter Trial Chamber) complied with the Prosecution’s request
and issued a subpoena (hereinafter Subpoena) to Randal.
On  May  8,  2002,  Randal  ﬁled  a  written  motion  to  have  the  Subpoena  
set aside.66  He  argued  that,  as  a  war  reporter,  he  should  enjoy  a  qualiﬁed  
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privilege from being compelled to testify, “based on the long-term public
interest  in  the  free  ﬂow  of  information  from  conﬂict  zones.”67 According
to Randal, if war reporters were routinely compelled to testify before
international criminal tribunals, they would be perceived as “an investigative arm of a judicial system” and lose access to potential sources.68
Randal also argued that the personal safety of war correspondents would
be further threatened if they came to be perceived as potential witnesses
for international criminal tribunals.69 The  Prosecution  ﬁled  their  written  
response to Randal’s motion on May 9, 2002 and on May 10, 2002 the
Trial Chamber heard the parties’ oral submissions.70
ii.  Trial  Chamber  Decision
On June 7, 2002, the Trial Chamber rendered its decision to dismiss
Randal’s motion and uphold the Subpoena.71 In reaching its decision,
the Trial Chamber accepted Randal’s argument that journalists reporting
from  conﬂict  zones  “play  a  vital  role  in  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the  
international  community  the  horrors  and  reality”  of  conﬂicts.72 It also
acknowledged that “journalists should not be subpoenaed unnecessarily” and that, when compelling the testimony of journalists, international
criminal tribunals should ensure that they are not unduly hampering,
obstructing or otherwise frustrating journalists’ vital news-gathering
role.73  The  Trial  Chamber  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  a  qualiﬁed  
privilege from testimony might be warranted to protect journalists from
having   to   reveal   conﬁdential   sources   or   unpublished   materials   before  
67
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international criminal tribunals.74 In the end, however, the Trial Chamber held that, when the testimony sought from a journalist relates only
to  identiﬁed  sources  and  published  materials,  its  compellability  “poses  
only a minimal threat to the news gathering and news reporting functions” of journalists.75 It also held that a published article is like a public
statement “and that when such a statement is entered in evidence in a
criminal trial and its credibility [is] challenged, the author, like anyone
else who makes a claim in public, must expect to be called to defend its
accuracy.”76 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber concluded that Randal had
“no right to pretend” that he could not be questioned on the article he
published simply because he was a journalist.77
It is worth noting that, in upholding the validity of the Subpoena,
the  Trial  Chamber  determined  that  it  was  sufﬁcient  that  the  testimony  
sought from Randal was “pertinent” to the Prosecution’s case against
Brdjanin.78 It also considered the fact that there was “absolutely no indication” that Randal, a retired journalist residing in Paris and the United
States, “could possibly be exposed to […] harm or risk” if forced to
testify.79
Randal  obtained  certiﬁcation  to  appeal  the  Trial  Chamber’s  decision  
on June 19, 2002.80  On  June  26,  2002,  he  ﬁled  written  submissions  in  
support of his appeal.81  The  Prosecution  ﬁled  their  response  to  Randal’s  
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written submissions on July 15, 2002.82 Randal replied to the same on
August 6, 2002.83 In the meantime, thirty-four media companies and associations of journalists obtained permission from the Appeals Chamber
of  the  ICTY  (hereinafter  Appeals  Chamber)  to  ﬁle  an  amici  curiae  brief  
in support of Randal’s appeal.84  The  same  was  ﬁled  on  August  16,  2002  
and on October 3, 2002 the Appeals Chamber heard the parties’ oral
submissions.85
iii.  Randal’s  Position
In advancing his position that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to recognize  a  qualiﬁed  privilege  for  journalists,  Randal  argued  that  such  a  privilege is necessary “to safeguard the ability of journalists to investigate
and  report  effectively”  from  conﬂict  zones.86 He noted that, “[w]ithout a
qualiﬁed  privilege,  journalists  may  be  put  at  risk  personally,  may  expose  
their sources to risk, and may be denied access to important information and sources in the future.”87 In Randal’s view, a failure on the part
of  international  criminal  tribunals  to  recognize  a  qualiﬁed  privilege  for  
journalists would result in “less journalistic exposure of international
crimes” and a consequential “hindering of the very process of international justice that international criminal tribunals […] are designed to
82
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serve.”88 Contrary to the opinion of the Trial Chamber, Randal argued
that,  to  be  effective,  a  qualiﬁed  privilege  for  journalists  would  have  to  
protect  identiﬁed  sources  and  published  materials  as  well  as  conﬁdential  
sources and unpublished materials.89
In his written submissions, Randal drew the Appeal Chambers’ attention to the fact that the ICTY had relied upon policy reasons to recognize testimonial privileges for certain other classes of individuals.90 He
submitted  that  comparable  policy  reasons  justiﬁed  the  recognition  of  a  
qualiﬁed  privilege  from  testimony  for  journalists.91 Randal also pointed
to  international  legal  materials  which  seemed  to  support  the  qualiﬁed  
privilege he sought.92 He noted, for example, that Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions93 recognizes the great dangers journalists
are  exposed  to  and  acknowledges  their  special  status  in  conﬂict  zones.94
He also noted that, in Goodwin,95 the European Court of Human Rights
recognized journalists’ unique role and the importance of protecting
journalistic sources.96 Finally, Randal claimed that cases from the United States and the United Kingdom, and the internal guidelines of the
United States Department of Justice, supported the creation of a qualiﬁed  privilege  for  journalists.97
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Randal submitted that, in determining whether to compel the testimony  of  a  journalist,  it  is  insufﬁcient  for  an  international  criminal  tribunal   to   ﬁnd,   as   the   Trial   Chamber   did,   that   the   sought   testimony   is  
“pertinent” to the case.98 Instead, Randal proposed that a journalist’s
testimony should only be compelled if it is shown that the journalist
will provide admissible evidence that: (1) is “of crucial importance”
to the “determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence”; (2) “cannot
be obtained by any other means or from any other witness”; (3) will
not   require   the   journalist   to   breach   any   obligation   of   conﬁdence;;   (4)  
will not put the journalist “or his family or sources in any reasonably
apprehended personal danger”; and, (5) will not result in the creation
“a precedent which would unnecessarily jeopardize the effectiveness or
safety of other journalists.”99
iv.  The  Position  of  the  Amici  Curiae
A number of the arguments made by Randal were reiterated by the Amici Curiae. They argued that forcing journalists to testify against their
sources would make potential sources “less likely to come forward, less
likely to speak freely, and more likely to fear that journalists are acting
as possible agents of their future prosecutor.”100 They also claimed that,
if compelled to testify, journalists would be robbed “of their status as
observers” and transformed “into participants, undermining their credibility and independence and thus their ability to gather information.”101
Like Randal, the Amici Curaie suggested that this would restrict the
important  beneﬁts  international  criminal  tribunals  and  the  public  stand  
to gain from the work of journalists.102
Among  other  documents,  the  Amici  Curaie  relied  upon  an  afﬁdavit  
sworn by the late Elizabeth Neuffer (hereinafter Neuffer),103 an awardwinning  reporter  who  covered  a  number  of  armed  conﬂicts  for  The  Boston Globe.104 Neuffer suggested that many journalists, herself included,
98
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had helped advance the work of international criminal tribunals by informally cooperating with the same.105 She noted that, while reporting
from the former Yugoslavia, she came to know many ICTY investigators and prosecutors and that, on several occasions, she passed information relating to war crimes along to them.106 By way of example, Neuffer
mentioned that it was her and her translator who led those investigating the Srebrenica genocide to the “trail of skeletons” they discovered
on Mt. Kamenica.107 Neuffer also noted that journalists who reported
from Rwanda and Zaire in 1997 often found themselves in possession
of information that ICTR investigators and prosecutors were incapable
of retrieving.108 According to Neuffer, some of those journalists willingly made the important information they gathered available to ICTR
staff.109
After drawing attention to the fact that journalists try to cooperate
with international criminal tribunals when they can,110 Neuffer suggested that it is often the case that journalists are not in a position to cooperate with such tribunals, particularly when they have obtained information   from   conﬁdential   sources.111 She was strongly against the ICTY
establishing a precedent that would permit journalists to be forced to
testify,  on  a  routine  basis,  about  conﬁdential  or  non-conﬁdential  sources.112 In Neuffer’s opinion, if war reporters were routinely compelled to
testify before international criminal tribunals, their independence would
be compromised and their safety further jeopardized.113 Implicit in her
comments was a warning to the ICTY and other international criminal
tribunals that they stand to lose the informal cooperation offered to them
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by war correspondents if they fail to grant war correspondents adequate
protections from having to testify.114
The test the Amici Curaie proposed for determining whether a subpoena can be issued to a journalist was simpler and less burdensome
than that proposed by Randal.115 They took the position that a subpoena
should only be issued to compel the testimony of a journalist when:
(1) the testimony is “absolutely essential to the case” and (2) the information sought “cannot be obtained by any other means.”116 The Amici
Curaie noted that for testimony to be “essential” it would have to be
critical to the determination a defendant’s guilt or innocence.117
v.  The  Prosecution’s  Position
Not surprisingly, the Prosecution took the position that the Trial Chamber  was  correct  in  refusing  to  create  a  qualiﬁed  privilege  which  would  
protect Randal from having to testify. The Prosecution noted that the
testimony  sought  from  Randal  only  concerned  non-conﬁdential  information.118  They  argued  that,  whatever  beneﬁts  might  be  gained  from  a  
privilege  protecting  testimony  concerning  conﬁdential  sources  and  materials,  “no  such  beneﬁts  accrue  from  a  privilege  protecting  testimony  
concerning  published  materials  and  openly  identiﬁed  sources.”119 Contrary to the views expressed by Randal and the Amici Curaie, the Prosecution suggested that it is the publication of information obtained by
journalists – rather than the possibility that journalists might be called
upon to testify about what they have published – which threatens their
future news-gathering ability.120 The Prosecution also maintained that,
if journalists were granted the testimonial privilege sought by Randal,
the ICTY’s ability to reach accurate judgments would be undermined
because essential evidence would be unavailable to it.121
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The Prosecution distinguished the testimonial privileges the ICTY
extended   to   other   classes   of   persons   from   the  qualiﬁed   privilege  proposed by Randal and the Amici Curaie.122 They also noted that a privilege   protecting   journalists   from   having   to   testify   about   non-conﬁdential sources and materials “would be unprecedented in international
or national legal systems.”123  Speciﬁcally,  the  Prosecution  argued  that  
the decision in Goodwin, and the cases from the United States and the
United Kingdom that were relied upon by Randal, were either largely, or
exclusively,  concerned  with  the  protection  of  conﬁdential  sources  and  
materials.124
The Prosecution submitted that the tests proposed by Randal and
the Amici Curaie would unduly hinder the ability of international criminal tribunals to achieve justice by restricting the relevant and probative
evidence available to them and potentially interfering with the fair trial
rights of accused persons.125 In the opinion of the Prosecution, the Trial
Chamber adopted the correct approach to determining the validity of the
Subpoena when it balanced the legitimate interests of journalists against
the interests of the international community, the victims of crime and
accused persons.126
vi.  Appeals  Chamber  Decision
The Appeals Chamber began its decision by noting that, while the parties and the Amici Curaie had framed the issue before it as one concerning journalists, the issue was really one concerning war correspondents,
a much narrower group.127 According to the Appeals Chamber, at stake
was the type of work done, and the risks faced by, individuals reporting
from  conﬂict  zones.128 Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that its decision
would  only  concern  “war  correspondents,”  who  it  deﬁned  as  “individu-
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als who, for any period of time, report (or investigate for the purpose of
reporting)  from  a  conﬂict  zone  on  issues  relating  to  the  conﬂict.”129
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that it was dealing with a novel issue, as there was no decided case law on the question of whether
a war correspondent can be compelled to testify before a war crimes
tribunal.130 It noted that the war correspondents who had previously
testiﬁed  at  the  ICTY  had  done  so  on  a  voluntary  basis.131 The Appeals
Chamber tackled the issue before it by posing itself the following three
questions:
(1) Is there a public interest in the work of war correspondents?
(2) If yes, would compelling war correspondents to testify before
a tribunal adversely affect their ability to carry out their work?
(3) If yes, what test is appropriate to balance the public interest in
accommodating the work of war correspondents with the public
interest in having all relevant evidence available to the court and,
where it is implicated, the right of the defendant to challenge the
evidence against him?132

a.  Public  Interest  in  the  Work  of  War  Correspondents
Without hesitation, the Appeals Chamber determined that there is a public interest in the work of war correspondents. It recognized the important role war correspondents play in ensuring that the public receives
vital   information   from   conﬂict   zones.133 It also recognized that information gathered by war correspondents might assist those responsible
for preventing or punishing major international crimes.134 The Appeals
Chamber went on to hold that the fact that there is a public interest in the
work of war correspondents is evidenced in international human rights
instruments, which provide that everyone has the right to freedom of expression.135 It stated that, in addition to granting journalists the right to
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freely communicate information, the right to freedom of expression “incorporates a right of members of the public to receive information.”136
b.  Consequences  of  Compelling  War  Correspondents  to  Testify        
After considering the arguments advanced by Randal and the Amici
Curaie, the Appeals Chamber concluded that it was “impossible to determine with certainty” whether, and to what extent, compelling war correspondents to testify before international criminal tribunals would “hamper their ability to work.”137 The Appeals Chamber did acknowledge,
however, that, if war correspondents were routinely compelled to testify
before international criminal tribunals, their ability to obtain important
information  and  to  provide  the  same  to  the  public  might  be  signiﬁcantly  
impacted.138 This was said to be true whether the testimony sought from
war  correspondents  related  to  conﬁdential  or  non-conﬁdential  sources  
and materials.139 According to the Appeals Chamber, “[w]hat really matters is the perception that war correspondents can be forced to become
witnesses against their interviewees.”140 The Appeals Chamber accepted
that, if perceived as potential witnesses, war correspondents might lose
their  ability  to  gather  signiﬁcant  information  and  become  targets,  rather  
than observers, of those who commit major international crimes.141
c.  The  Appropriate  Test
The Appeals Chamber held that an international criminal tribunal must
employ a balancing exercise when deciding whether to compel the testimony of a war correspondent.142  Speciﬁcally,  it  held  that  the  interest  
of justice in having all relevant evidence put before the international
criminal tribunal must be balanced with the public interest in the work
of war correspondents.143 Although the Appeals Chamber agreed with
136
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Randal and the Amici Curaie that the test of “pertinence” applied by the
Trial Chamber did not adequately protect the public interest in the work
of war correspondents, it thought that the alternative tests proposed by
Randal and the Amici Curaie were too stringent.144 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber came up with its own test. It held that a subpoena can
only be issued to a war correspondent if the party seeking the subpoena
demonstrates that the testimony sought from the war correspondent: (1)
“is of direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case”
and (2) “cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere.”145
d.  Validity  of  Subpoena  Issued  to  Randal
In light of the test it established for determining whether a war correspondent can be compelled to testify before an international criminal tribunal, the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber
and set the subpoena aside.146 It refused, however, to determine whether,
on the facts of the case, Randal could be compelled to testify before the
ICTY.147 The Appeals Chamber held that this determination should be
left to a trial chamber and that, if the Prosecution still wished to compel
Randal’s testimony, they would have to submit a new application for a
subpoena.148
Although it did not resolve the issue of whether Randal himself
could be compelled by the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber did make a
number of observations that related to this issue. It noted, for example,
that, even if a trial chamber were to decide that Randal could not be
compelled to testify, the article he published might still be admitted into
evidence.149 The Appeals Chamber suggested that admitting the article
into evidence, without compelling Randal’s testimony, would not necessarily prejudice Brdjanin as: (1) the Defence would still be able to
question its accuracy and (2) the weight accorded to it by a trial chamber
would take Randal’s unavailability into account.150 The Appeals Cham144
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ber also noted that, irrespective of the evidentiary value of the article, a
trial chamber determining whether to issue a subpoena to Randal would
have to consider whether his testimony, in and of itself, would be of
direct and important value to determining a core issue in the case.151
The Appeals Chamber expressed the view that, in light of the fact that
Randal did not speak Brdjanin’s language (and thus that he relied on
another  journalist  for  interpretation),  it  was  “difﬁcult  to  imagine”  how  
his testimony could reach that threshold.152
vii.  Second  Request  for  a  Subpoena  Compelling  Randal’s  Testimony
In light of the observations offered by the Appeals Chamber in the Randal case, it is not surprising that, when the Prosecution made its second
request for a subpoena to compel Randal’s testimony, the Trial Chamber:
(1) refused the request and (2) admitted Randal’s article into evidence
“without prejudice to the weight to be ascribed to it.”153 In reaching its
decision,  the  Trial  Chamber  admitted  that  it  found  it  difﬁcult  to  depart  
from the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning.154
2. Critique of the Randal Case
Much credit ought to be given to the Appeals Chamber for its recognition of the need for international criminal tribunals to give heed to
the public’s interest in the work of war correspondents when exercising
their power to compel witness testimony. The Randal case, however,
is   not   without   its   ﬂaws.   The   debate   it   sparked   among   journalists,   for  
example,  suggests  that  the  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  it  created  may  
unnecessarily protect war correspondents from having to testify about
sources  they  have  identiﬁed  and  materials  they  have  published.  In  addition, there is a concern that the privilege the Randal case granted to war
correspondents  may:  (1)  open  the  ﬂoodgates  to  new  testimonial  privi151
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lege claims and (2) allow groups other than journalists reporting from
conﬂict  zones  to  claim  access  to  it.  It  is  also  disconcerting  that  the  Randal case overlooked the option of granting witness protective measures,
rather  than  a  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege,  to  war  correspondents.  Finally, by contemplating that the work product of a war correspondent
can be admitted into evidence, notwithstanding the fact that its creator
cannot be compelled to testify, the Randal case did not adequately consider the fair trial rights of an accused.
i.  Disagreement  About  Whether  War  Correspondents  Require  (or  
Deserve)  a  Qualiﬁed  Testimonial  Privilege  
The  signiﬁcant  public  attention  the  Randal  case  received  sparked  a  debate among journalists regarding what their responsibilities are in the
prosecution of perpetrators of major international crimes.155 Although
Randal had the support of a coalition of media companies and press
freedom groups, there were a number of respected journalists who
expressed their disagreement with the arguments he advanced in the
ICTY.156
For example, Randal was harshly criticized by Ed Vulliamy (hereinafter Vulliamy), a prize-winning war correspondent for the Guardian.157
Like  Randal,  Vulliamy  covered  the  conﬂict  in  the  former  Yugoslavia.  
Unlike Randal, however, Vulliamy elected to testify before the ICTY –
in  1997,  he  voluntarily  gave  evidence  in  the  case  of  Milan  Kovačević.158
Vulliamy’s experience testifying before the ICTY was by no means
enjoyable.159 Despite this, he expressed the view that the arguments
advanced by Randal were “dangerously wrong.”160 Vulliamy suggested
that, by seeking to ensure that the testimony of journalists was unavailable to international criminal tribunals, Randal was threatening the ef155
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ﬁcacy   of   such   tribunals.161 In Vulliamy’s opinion, war reporters have
a professional, moral and legal obligation “to stand by their stories on
oath” before international criminal tribunals.162 He suggested that journalists, who often possess valuable information, should not be able to
“perch loftily above the due process of law.”163 Regarding Randal’s
suggestion that compelling journalists to testify before international
criminal tribunals would turn them into targets, Vulliamy simply stated
that “[g]ood reporters put themselves in danger, whether they testify or
not.”164
While Randal’s appeal was pending, Jacky Rowland, a journalist
who   covered   the   conﬂict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia   for   the   BBC,   voluntarily  testiﬁed  before  the  ICTY  in  the  case  of  Slobodan  Milošević.165
Rowland said that she felt she had a duty to testify and that she did not
“really buy the argument” that testifying before international criminal
tribunals “makes life more dangerous for journalists”.166 Martin Bell,
another   journalist   who   covered   the   conﬂict   in   the   former  Yugoslavia  
for  the  BBC,  and  who  voluntarily  testiﬁed  before  the  ICTY,167 took the
position that a journalist’s “duties as a citizen,”which include the duty
to testify before international criminal tribunals when one witnesses a
crime or the aftermath of a crime, come before his or her “duties as a
journalist.”168
Lindsey  Hilsum,  a  freelance  journalist  who  covered  the  conﬂict  in  
Rwanda, made similar comments when she described why she agreed to
testify before the ICTR in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu.169 According
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to Hilsum, “[r]eporting matters, but sometimes justice matters more.”170
Hilsum  said  that  the  horror  she  witnessed  in  Rwanda  was  sufﬁcient  to  
make the rules protecting journalists from having to testify seem inapplicable.171 Although Hilsum acknowledged that, as a journalist, she
could have argued against testifying, she said that, as a human being,
she could not.172 Hilsum did not believe that by testifying before the
ICTR she put herself and other journalists in danger.173 In her opinion,
“[a] war correspondent’s job is more dangerous than it used to be because 24-hour satellite television has made combatants aware of the media,”  not  because  a  handful  of  war  correspondents  have  testiﬁed  before  
international criminal tribunals.174
It is important to note that, like the testimony sought from Randal,
the testimony sought from the above-noted war correspondents related
only to information that was already in the public domain. It is quite possible that the views expressed by Vulliamy, Rowland, Bell and Hilsum
would  have  been  different  had  they  been  called  upon  to  reveal  conﬁdential sources or unpublished materials before an international criminal
tribunal.  In  any  event,  at  least  with  respect  to  identiﬁed  sources  and  published materials, their comments call into question whether the work of
war  correspondents  will  be  signiﬁcantly  hampered  if  their  testimony  is  
too easily compelled by international criminal tribunals. Consequently,
one  must  question  whether  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  qualiﬁed  privilege  
to protect war correspondents from having to testify before international
criminal  tribunals  about  non-conﬁdential  sources  and  materials.
ii.  Opening  the  Floodgates  to  Other  Testimonial  Privilege  Claims  
Some   have   expressed   concern   that   the   qualiﬁed   testimonial   privilege  
created for war correspondents in the Randal case might “spur a rash
of claims for the creation of similar privileges” for other individuals
who   do   important   work   in   conﬂict   zones.175 This concern is valid. It
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has already been suggested, for example, that members of humanitarian
organizations  should,  at  a  minimum,  be  able  to  claim  the  qualiﬁed  testimonial privilege that has been afforded to war correspondents.176
Like war correspondents, humanitarian organizations “are in a privileged position to observe what happens in war.”177 As a consequence,
they are often contacted by those tasked with bringing perpetrators of
major international crimes to justice to see what information they can
offer.178 Notwithstanding the fact that many humanitarian organizations
support the idea of having perpetrators of major international crimes
tried before international criminal tribunals, they are often reluctant to
have their members testify in international criminal proceedings.179 This
is because they worry about compromising their perceived neutrality,
forfeiting their access to victims, and putting the safety of their staff at
risk.180 As such, it will be surprising if humanitarian organizations do
not jump at the chance to rely upon the Randal case to claim that, like
war correspondents, their members deserve a privilege from testifying
before international criminal tribunals.
In light of the line of reasoning adopted by the Appeals Chamber in
the Randal case, it is not unlikely that such claims would be successful.
It is certainly arguable that there is at least as great a public interest in
the work of humanitarian organizations, which provide food, shelter and
medical  treatment  to  victims  of  armed  conﬂicts,  as  there  is  in  the  work  
of war correspondents.181 In addition, it is conceivable that routinely
compelling members of such organizations to testify before international criminal tribunals would have the same adverse affects on their ability to carry out their work as those the Appeals Chamber sought to avoid
by  creating  a  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents.182
In   addition   to   the   concern   that   the   qualiﬁed   testimonial   privilege  
created  for  war  correspondents  in  the  Randal  case  might  open  the  ﬂoodgates to new testimonial privilege claims, there is a concern that the
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existing privilege could be relied upon by groups other than journalists
reporting  from  conﬂict  zones.  It  has  been  suggested,  for  example,  that  
the privilege might protect individuals employed by human rights monitors like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who, like war
correspondents,  are  sent  into  conﬂict  zones  to  gather  information  which  
they subsequently report on.183 It is certainly arguable that because the
deﬁnition  of  ‘war  correspondents’  articulated  by  the  Appeals  Chamber  
in the Randal case is not tied to the terms ‘journalist’, ‘media’ or the
‘press’, it may be broad enough to open the door “for a substantial class
of individuals to claim access to the privilege.”184
The potential the Randal case has to (1) trigger new testimonial privilege claims and (2) cause unforeseen individuals to claim access to the
privilege that has been created for war correspondents is problematic.
The interlocutory proceedings necessary to deal with the potential wave
of   testimonial   privilege   claims   would   undoubtedly   affect   the   efﬁcacy  
of international criminal tribunals.185 If international criminal tribunals
ﬁnd  themselves  “occupied  by  privilege-based  litigation,”  rather  than  the  
adjudication of cases brought against alleged war criminals, they will
be in danger of losing much of the support they have gained from the
international community.186 In addition, and perhaps more importantly,
if international criminal tribunals make a habit of granting testimonial
privileges to all those individuals who can claim to be in a situation
analogous to that of war correspondents, they will seriously impair their
fact-ﬁnding  function  and  their  ability  to  serve  the  purposes  for  which  
they were created.
iii.  An  Option  Overlooked  in  the  Randal  Case
Existing international criminal tribunals have a range of measures at
their disposal which they can use to ensure that a witness’ identity is not
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disclosed to the public.187 Among other things, they can: (1) allow witnesses to use a pseudonym; (2) delete witnesses’ names or identifying
information from public records; (3) hold closed session hearings; and,
(4) use voice or image-altering devices on the television recordings of
their proceedings.188 Although these measures are typically employed
“to ensure the safety of victim-witnesses,” there is nothing preventing
them from being used to protect “other reluctant witnesses.”189 Notwithstanding that the written submissions of both Randal and the Prosecution
discussed the ICTY’s ability to grant protective measures to war correspondents, no mention was made of this option in the Randal case.190
That the Appeals Chamber overlooked the ICTY’s ability to employ
protective  measures  to  keep  the  identity  of  war  correspondents  conﬁdential is problematic. If, as the Appeals Chamber suggested, what really matters is avoiding the perception that war correspondents can be
forced to become witnesses against their interviewees, it seems that it
might   be   sufﬁcient   to   grant   protective   measures,   rather   than   a   qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege,  to  war  correspondents.191 It is certainly arguable that protective measures could be used to ensure that the public remained  unaware  of  the  fact  that  a  war  correspondent  testiﬁed  before  an  
international criminal tribunal. A war correspondent could, for example,
be   issued   a   conﬁdential   subpoena   and   offered   the   “particularly   stringent protective measures”192 that were offered to reluctant witnesses in
Blaškić.193 Those measures included the use of in camera testimony, a
redaction of the witnesses’ names (and any information that might iden-
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tify them) from all public documents and a prohibition against divulging
any information about the witnesses and their testimony.194
The fact that the Appeals Chamber overlooked the option of granting protective measures to war correspondents does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that war correspondents should never enjoy a privilege
from testifying before international criminal tribunals. It does, however,
suggest that the test proposed by the Appeals Chamber needs to be reworked. In determining whether to compel the testimony of a war correspondent, an international criminal tribunal should at least consider
whether  the  employment  of  protective  measures  might  be  sufﬁcient  to  
avoid  any  adverse  consequences  that  could  ﬂow  from  compelling  the  
war correspondent’s testimony.
iv.  Inadequate  Attention  Paid  to  the  Rights  of  the  Accused
In  the  Randal  case,  the  Appeals  Chamber  sought  to  create  a  qualiﬁed  
testimonial privilege for war correspondents that would fairly balance
the interest of justice in having all relevant evidence put before a court
and the public interest in the work of war correspondents. Unfortunately,   insufﬁcient   attention   was   paid   to   the   effect   the   resulting   privilege  
might have on the fair trial rights of an accused. The fair trial rights of
an accused include the right of an accused to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him. That this right “is fundamental to the
fairness”195 of international criminal proceedings is evidenced by the
fact that it is provided for in the statutes governing the ICTY, the ICTR
and the ICC.196 The right of an accused to examine, or have examined,
the witnesses against him does not always equate to a right of cross-examination. However, it is clear that, when a statement is admitted into
evidence in the absence of cross-examination, an accused is deprived of
the opportunity to confront a witness against him and the international
criminal tribunal hearing his case is deprived of the opportunity to assess the witness’ credibility.197
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It is disconcerting that the Randal case contemplates, and has been
relied  upon  to  ﬁnd,  that  the  work  product  of  a  war  correspondent  (e.g.  
a newspaper article) can be admitted into evidence notwithstanding the
fact that the war correspondent cannot be compelled to testify.198 When
this occurs, there is a real possibility that, because the accused will be
denied an opportunity to cross-examine the war correspondent, the fairness of the international criminal proceedings will be brought into question.199 It might be alleged, for example, that the international criminal
tribunal has undermined the accused’s right to confront his accuser.200
This problem is compounded by the fact that it appears that the rationale
behind  the  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  recognized  in  the  Randal  case  
is that war correspondents “serve a public interest in providing accurate
information   from   a   conﬂict-torn   area.”201 It thus looks as though the
evidentiary value of the work product of war correspondents is being
pre-judged to the accused’s detriment.202
The suggestion made by the Appeals Chamber in the Randal case
– that admitting the work product of a war correspondent into evidence
in the absence of cross-examination will not necessarily prejudice the
fair trial rights of an accused – is less than convincing. It is based upon
the assumption that a Trial Chamber can be relied up to assign an appropriate amount of weight to an unsworn statement that the accused has
not had an opportunity to challenge. This is a problematic assumption,
particularly when one considers that the facts of a case before an international criminal tribunal are typically drafted by a legal assistant who
has not been provided with “detailed instructions from the judges as to
their assessment of the reliability of each piece of evidence and how it
relates to the others.”203
In light of the above, it is clear that the work product of a war correspondent who is protected by the privilege created in the Randal case
should not be admitted as evidence. The fact that an accused will be
denied the opportunity to cross-examine a war correspondent should be
198
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enough to deprive the war correspondent’s work product of “so much of
its probative value as to render it inadmissible.”204 Accordingly, in order
to protect the fair trial rights of an accused, the testimonial privilege
created in the Randal case should come with the proviso that the work
product of any war correspondents it protects will not be admitted into
evidence.
3. Extension of the Testimonial Privilege for War Correspondents
Created in the Randal Case
Because the Appeals Chamber is shared by the ICTY and the ICTR,
its decision in the Randal case will serve as a precedent for both tribunals.205  Accordingly,   the   qualiﬁed   testimonial   privilege   created   in   the  
Randal case will be respected by the ICTR as well the ICTY. It is not at
all certain, however, that war correspondents will be offered any protection from having their testimony compelled by the ICC. Although it is
likely that the Randal case will be relied upon in proceedings before the
ICC, it will have no binding effect on the permanent tribunal.206
The issue of whether journalists, including war correspondents,
should enjoy a privilege from testifying before the ICC was considered by those who drafted the ICC’s rules.207 Unfortunately, no consensus was reached on the issue.208 As outlined earlier, the ICC’s rules
regarding testimonial privileges in their present form seek only to protect  communications  made  in  the  context  of  conﬁdential  relationships.  
The  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  granted  to  war  correspondents  in  the  
Randal case is thus much more expansive than any testimonial privilege
contemplated by the ICC’s rules.209 If the ICC judges opt to create a
testimonial  privilege  for  war  correspondents  within  the  conﬁnes  of  the  
ICC’s  existing  rules,  the  privilege  will  only  protect  conﬁdential  communications between war correspondents and their sources. Accordingly, it
will be of little assistance to war correspondents like Randal, who are
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reluctant  to  testify  about  sources  they  have  identiﬁed  and  materials  they  
have published.
Of course, there is nothing in the rules governing the ICC that speciﬁcally  prohibit  it  from  adopting  of  the  qualiﬁed  privilege  for  war  correspondents recognized in the Randal case.210 Although ICC judges are
much more restricted in their ability to create new rules than judges
of the ICTY and the ICTR are, they have been granted the power to
develop new rules where the ICC’s existing rules “do not provide for a
speciﬁc  situation”  that  comes  before  them.211 In light of the decision that
was rendered in the Randal case, the issue of whether war correspondents should be protected by a testimonial privilege will likely be raised
proceedings before the ICC at some point in the future. As this issue is
not addressed in the ICC’s existing rules, it is within the power of the
ICC judges to create a new rule to address it. Whether the ICC judges
should   adopt   the   qualiﬁed   testimonial   privilege   created   in   the   Randal  
case, however, is up for debate.
In  light  of  the  ﬂaws  in  the  Randal  case,  it  would  be  less  than  ideal  if  
the  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  it  created  was  simply  adopted  by  the  
ICC. As it is uncertain that a testimonial privilege is needed to protect
war   correspondents   from   being   compelled   to   testify   about   non-conﬁdential   sources   and   materials,   it   might   very   well   be   sufﬁcient   for   the  
ICC to recognize a testimonial privilege for war correspondents within
the  conﬁnes  of  its  existing  rules.  Unlike  the  testimonial  privilege  recognized in the Randal case, such a privilege (which would only protect  conﬁdential  communications  between  war  correspondents  and  their  
sources) would be in keeping with the theory that testimonial privileges
should be narrowly construed. In addition, so long as it appropriately
deﬁned  who  ‘war  correspondents’  are,  such  a  privilege  would  be  sufﬁciently  restrictive  to  prevent  the  ﬂoodgates  being  opened  to  a  host  of  
new testimonial privilege claims.
In   order   to   avoid   the   adverse   consequences   that   might   ﬂow   from  
routinely compelling war correspondents to testify before the ICC about
non-conﬁdential  sources  and  materials,  the  ICC  judges  could  develop  
guidelines to assist them in exercising their discretion to subpoena
war correspondents. Rather than imposing a strict test, as the Appeals
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Chamber did in the Randal case, such guidelines could set out a variety
of factors to be considered by an ICC judge contemplating compelling
the testimony of a war correspondent. These factors might include: (1)
the importance of the testimony sought from the war correspondent;
(2) whether the information sought to be obtained from the war correspondent might be obtained elsewhere; (3) whether protective measures
could be provided to the war correspondent to alleviate some of the concerns raised in the Randal case; and, (4) whether the fair trial rights of
the  accused  would  be  sufﬁciently  respected  if  the  war  correspondent’s  
testimony was not compelled. Parallel guidelines could be created for
the ICC prosecutors to assist them in exercising their discretion to seek
subpoenas to compel the testimony of war correspondents.

CONCLUSION
The Randal case drew attention to the need to ensure that war correspondents are not routinely compelled to testify before international
criminal  tribunals.  The  qualiﬁed  testimonial  privilege  it  created,  however, overshot the mark and has the potential to give rise to many more
problems than it sought to resolve. It is clear that international criminal
tribunals should recognize a testimonial privilege that seeks to protect
war   correspondents   from   a   compulsion   to   testify   about   conﬁdential  
sources and materials. This was acknowledged by all of the parties to
the Randal case and is supported by the efforts made by domestic and
regional   tribunals   to   protect   conﬁdential   journalistic   sources.  What   is  
not clear is whether a testimonial privilege is necessary to protect war
correspondents  from  being  compelled  to  testify  about  non-conﬁdential  
sources and materials. As this paper illustrates, it seems that measures
short  of  a  testimonial  privilege  might  be  sufﬁcient  to  avoid  the  adverse  
consequences   that   could   ﬂow   from   routinely   compelling   war   correspondents to testify about such matters. Because testimonial privileges
undermine the ability of international criminal tribunals to make factually   accurate   ﬁndings,   they   should   only   be   recognized   in   the   clearest  
of cases. Accordingly, while international criminal tribunals should be
leery of issuing subpoenas to war correspondents when their testimony
is unnecessary, they should not recognize a testimonial privilege to protect war correspondents from being compelled to testify about non-conﬁdential  sources  and  materials.        

